@conference{
author = "Nikolić, Dragana and Kovačević, Ana and Stanković, Srboljub",
year = "2013",
abstract = "Nuclear installations, such as nuclear power plants, research reactors, reprocessing facilities and other components of the nuclear fuel cycle, including the transport between these sites, are among the most critical infrastructures not only for their importance in the energy sector, but also because of the severity and the extent of the potential consequences in case of accidents involving nuclear and other radioactive materials. The possible threat ranges from extreme natural occurrences (such as earthquakes, tornadoes, flooding), failures of structures and components, installation internal type events and human errors, to unauthorized removal of nuclear material and malicious acts intended to cause damage, culminating with terrorist attack. Some of these threats are primarily taken into account in safety analysis, while others are in the focus of security assessment. Although nuclear safety and security regimes have a different focus, they overlap with each other and have a common objective - to prevent radiological damage to population, property and the environment, and to avoid negative economic effects and social disruption. Therefore, establishing and maintaining effective protection of nuclear installations and nuclear material is a complex task that requires careful evaluation of risks and consideration of both safety and security measures for risk prevention and mitigation of the consequences. This paper is focused on nuclear security systems and arrangements for the protection of nuclear installations, nuclear and other radioactive material. In particular, a threat assessment process and methodology for the development, use and maintaining of the Design Basis Threat (DBT) are presented. The whole process is based upon a risk managed and threat-driven approach. DBT represents the largest reasonable threat that a facility should expect to defend against. It is an important tool used to determine well-specified threat levels, providing a representative set of attributes and characteristics of potential adversaries (internal and/ or external). Since the DBT also provides detailed and precise technical foundations for the design and evaluation criteria for a physical protection system, the margins of achieving the adequate degree of assurance that the level of protection is sufficient are explored. Some common principles of nuclear safety and nuclear security are outlined in this paper and the importance of their correlation for efficient protection of nuclear facilities is discussed. The conclusion reached is that, in the context of the increased focus on defences against terrorists at nuclear facilities, the new, extended approach to analysis of the beyond DBT events is needed, to include more severe attacks as well as combination of the different types of threats. In addition, the application of more stringent requirements for physical protection and promoting of nuclear security culture at all levels of nuclear security regime is recommended.",
publisher = "Belgrade : University of Belgrade, Faculty of Security Studies",
journal = "International conference "National Critical Infrastructure Protection - Regional Perspective" : Book of abstracts",
title = "Threat Assessment for the Design of the Effective Protection System for Nuclear Installations",
pages = "51-52",
url = "https://hdl.handle.net/21.15107/rcub_vinar_12145"
}
